anaphoric uses. Prince is not specific, either, about which are the possible associations between bridging descriptions and their anchors. She calls them all inferrables and says that “when a speaker evokes some entity in the discourse, it is often the case that s/he assumes that the hearer can infer the (discourse) existence of certain other entities, based on the speaker's beliefs about the hearers' beliefs and reasoning ability” (Prince, 1992 - page 304). Based on a general idea of “reasoning ability of speakers” I inferred that she would classify as inferrable all the examples in the table.
F raurud's first mention class seems to apply in general; exceptions are, perhaps, those uses classified by Clark as set-membership. L?bner says that associative anaphora are semantic FC2s with anaphoric arguments. He considers, in particular, those descriptions which have a relational noun (use), and whose argument is specified by an antecedent. Some of the associations exemplified in the table seem to be based on other grounds, however; such cases were indicated by question marks. Clark's account points to several distinct relations. His set-membership relation is classified as direct reference; all other relations listed under Clark in Table 2 are classified as indirect reference. Sidner's cases of associated specification descriptions correspond clearly to those explicitly referred by Hawkins and Prince as associative anaphoric and inferrable. It is not clear how broad her class of associated specification was meant to be, but we considered it to be very general; her inferred specification rule applies for those cases based on hearers′ suppositions. Clark's and Strand's classifications are the most detailed. Strand (1977) suggests that a causation link (a third subclass in the adjoining class) might be applied for the cases in which there is a relation of reason, cause and consequence. Strand does not classify optional roles (cases which involve hearers' suppositions) which are observed by Clark.
T he situational uses are presented in Tables 3 (a and b). Hawkins and L?bner agree that some cases refer directly to the physical context (pragmatic deictic, visible and immediate situation) whereas others (semantic FC2s with deictic argument and larger situation) only relate to the context, in the sense that their interpretation involves context identification and reasoning. Some uses may rely either on specific or general knowledge: in the example of a wedding situation, the interpretation of a description such as the bride may involve either specific knowledge of the referent or the general knowledge that weddings have brides. The same ambiguity is expressed in terms of situationally inferrable3 or unused in Prince's taxonomy. Fraurud also reckons that first mention uses may require situational anchors or referents, although she does not name different classes for them.
2These descriptions are not considered to be complemented with full relatives.
3Prince does not use this term herself but we explained it before.
I n Tables 4 (a and b) the description the colour red is given as unfamiliar by Hawkins but would probably fit better in Prince's unused. All but one unfamiliar use are semantic definites in L?bner's scheme. L?bner discriminates the woman Bill went out with from uses like the fact that... probably because in the first case the referent is just associated to another known entity, whereas in the latter the conceptual referent is determined by the complement (although both are based on complements which disambiguate a sortal head noun). Later in (L?bner 1996) he presents the book I gave you yesterday as an FC1 but he does not say whether he is considering it semantic or pragmatic. Note that the descriptions that illustrate situational and unfamiliar uses are potentially discourse new. However, nothing prevents them from being used in subsequent mention. Hawkins and L?bner give the most complete classifications for discourse new descriptions.
